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Abstract
Although multi-agent reinforcement learning can tackle systems of strategically interacting entities, it
currently fails in scalability and lacks rigorous convergence guarantees. Crucially, learning in multi-agent
systems can become intractable due to the explosion in the size of the state-action space as the number of
agents increases. In this paper, we propose a method for computing closed-loop optimal policies in multi-
agent systems that scales independently of the number of agents. This allows us to show, for the first time,
successful convergence to optimal behaviour in systems with an unbounded number of interacting adaptive
learners. Studying the asymptotic regime of N−player stochastic games, we devise a learning protocol
that is guaranteed to converge to equilibrium policies even when the number of agents is extremely large.
Our method is model-free and completely decentralised so that each agent need only observe its local state
information and its realised rewards. We validate these theoretical results by showing convergence to Nash-
equilibrium policies in applications from economics and control theory with thousands of strategically
interacting agents.
Introduction
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) provides the potential to systematically analyse environments
with strategically interacting agents. Despite the fundamental relevance of multi-agent systems (MASs) with
appreciably large populations, learning stable, best-response policies in MASs with more than a few agents
remains a significant challenge due to growth in complexity as the number of agents increases (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown 2008). Consequently, the task of understanding agent behaviour in many systems of interest
has been left unaddressed.
This paper seeks to address the problem of learning stable, best-response policies within non-cooperative1
MASs when the size of the population is large, therefore expanding the range of applications of multi-agent
technology.
In a non-cooperative MAS, selfish agents compete to obtain a sequence of rewards within an unknown
environment. A stochastic (dynamic) game (SG) is a mathematical framework that analyses the behaviour of
strategically interacting entities in non-cooperative settings. Stochastic games enable stable policy outcomes
1In game theory, the term non-cooperative implies that each agent seeks to pursue its own objectives and agreements between agents
over their actions cannot be enforced.
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in which agents respond optimally to one another (know as equilibria), to be fully described. In SGs, it is
assumed that agents have either fixed knowledge of their environment or can acquire knowledge of any miss-
ing data by simply observing other agents with which agents can compute best-response actions. However,
in many multi-agent systems, agents do not have full information of the environment from the outset and
direct computation of optimal behaviour is often prohibitively complex.
Naturally, integrating stochastic game theory with reinforcement learning (RL) - a framework that en-
ables agents to learn optimal behaviour within an unknown environment through direct interaction and ex-
ploration - suggests the potential to learn stable policies in multi-agent systems.
Although this approach has led to fruitful analysis in multi-agent systems with few interacting agents (Leibo
et al. 2017), current methods of computing multi-agent equilibria using RL (e.g. Nash Q-Learning (Hu and
Wellman 2004), Friend-or-Foe Q-learning (Littman 2001), minimax-Q (Littman 1994)) have computational
complexity that increases exponentially with the number of agents (Busoniu, Babuska, and De Schutter 2008;
Tuyls and Weiss 2012). This renders the task of using RL to learn equilibrium policies intractable for many
systems of interest.
In this paper, we introduce an approach that enables equilibrium policies of multi-agent systems to be
computed even when the size of the population is extremely large. Unlike current multi-agent learning pro-
cedures, our method scales independently of the number of interacting agents. In contrast to approaches that
compute equilibria in large population games (Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo 2017), our method is a model-
free, fully decentralised learning procedure that only requires agents to observe local state information and
their realised rewards.
Our main result demonstrates that the equilibria of N− player SGs can be computed by solving an op-
timal control problem (OCP) using a model-free learning procedure under very mild assumptions. To do
this, we prove a series of theoretical results: first, we establish a novel link between reinforcement learning
in MASs and a class of games known as discrete-time mean field games - N−player SGs in an asymptotic
regime as N → ∞. Secondly, we demonstrate that in the asymptotic regime, the resultant game belongs
to a class of games known as potential games. These are reducible to a single objective OCP leading to a
vast reduction in the problem complexity. Our last result proves that the equilibria of SGs in an asymptotic
regime are in fact approximate equilibria of the N− player SG with an approximation error that vanishes as
N increases. Finally, we validate our theoretical results by application to a series of problems within eco-
nomics and optimal control theory. Our approach is based on a variant of the fictitious play - a belief-based
learning rule for static games introduced by Brown (Brown 1951) and generalised to adaptive play in (Leslie
and Collins 2006) for games with finite action sets.
After formulating the problem as an SG, the paper is organised as follows: first, we provide a formal
description of a discrete-time mean field game and show that the game is a potential game (Theorem 1). We
show that given the potentiality property, the problem is reducible to a single objective OCP. We then intro-
duce the learning protocol and show that under this protocol, the game has strong convergence guarantees
to equilibrium policies (Theorem 2). We lastly show that the equilibria generated for the mean field game
are approximate equilibria of the N−player SG with an approximation error that vanishes as N increases
(Theorem 3). Taking benchmark examples from economics and the multi-agent literature, we demonstrate
our method within a number of examples with large populations of interacting agents.
Background
We now give the background for SG theory by introducing the N−player SG formalism. In order to handle
multi-agent systems with large populations, we consider the N−player SG formalism when the number
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of agents tends to infinity - we therefore introduce the notion of mean field games - SGs studied in the
asymptotic regime in the number of agents.
Problem formulation: N−Player Stochastic Games
The canonical framework to describe multi-agent systems in which agents behave rationally and non-
cooperatively is a stochastic (dynamic) game (SG). Let us therefore introduce a formal description of an
SG:
Let N , {1, . . . , N} denote the set of agents where N ∈ N. At each time step k ∈ 1, 2, . . . T ∈ N,2 the
state of agent i ∈ N is xik ∈ Si where Si ⊂ Rd is a d−dimensional state space. The state of the system at
time k ≤ T is given by xk , (xik)i∈N where xk ∈ S , ×j∈NSj , which is the Cartesian product of space
of states for each agent. Let Πi be a non-empty compact set of stochastic closed-loop policies3 for agent i
where pii : S → ∆Ai where Ai ⊆ Rd is a compact, non-empty action set for each agent i ∈ N . Denote
by Π the set of policies for all agents i.e. Π , ×j∈NΠj . We denote by Π−i , ×j∈N\{i}Πj , the Cartesian
product of the policy sets for all agents except agent i ∈ N .
At each time step, each agent i ∈ N exercises its policy pii, the agent’s state then transitions according to
the following4:
xik+1 = f(x
i
k, a
i
k, ζk), a
i
k ∼ pii, k = 0, 1, . . . , T (1)
where {ζk}0≤k≤T is a collection of i.i.d. random variables that introduce randomness in the agent’s state
transition.
Each agent i has a cumulative reward function J i : S × Πi × Π−i → R that it seeks to maximise given by
the following:
J i[xt, pi
i, pi−i] = Ex∼f
[
T∑
k=t
L(xik, x
−i
k , a
i
k)
∣∣∣aik ∼ pii
]
, (2)
where xik ∈ Si and x−ik ∈ S−i are the state for agent i and the collection of states for agents j ∈ N\{i} at
time k ≤ T respectively and piik is the policy for agent i. The function L is the instantaneous reward function
which measures the reward received by the agent at each time step. We refer to the system of equations (1) -
(2) as game (A).
We now formalise the notion of optimality within an SG, in particular, a Markov-Nash-equilibrium for
the game (A) is the solution concept when every agent plays their best response to the policies of other
agents. Formally, we define the notion of equilibrium for this game by the following:
Definition 1. The strategy profile pi = (pii, pi−i) ∈ Π is said to be a Markov-Nash equilibrium (M-NE)
strategy if, for any policy for agent i, pi′i ∈ Πi and ∀y ∈ S, we have:
J i[y, pii, pi−i] ≥ J i[y, pi′i, pi−i], ∀i ∈ N . (3)
The M-NE condition identifies strategic configurations in which no agent can improve their rewards by
a unilateral deviation from their current strategy.
We will later consider approximate solutions to the game (A). In order to formalise the notion of an
2The formalism can be straightforwardly extended to infinite horizon cases by appropriate adjustment of the reward function.
3Closed-loop policies are maps from states to actions and are likely to be the only policies that produce optimal behaviour in
stochastic systems. Open-loop policies simply specify pre-computed (state-independent) sequences of actions.
4With this specification, agents do not influence each others’ transition dynamics directly - this is a natural depiction of various
systems e.g. a portfolio manager’s modification to their own market position. This does not limit generality since prohibited state
transitions (e.g. collisions) can be disallowed with a reward function that heavily penalises such joint action behaviour.
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approximate solution, we introduce −Markov-Nash equilibria (−M-NE) which extends the concept of M-
NE to strategy profiles in which the incentive to deviate never exceeds some fixed constant. The notion of an
−M-NE can be described using an analogous condition to (3). Formally, the strategy profile (pii, pi−i) ∈ Π
is an −Markov-Nash equilibrium strategy profile if for a given  > 0 and for any individual strategy for
agent i, pi′i ∈ Πi we have that ∀y ∈ S:
J i[y, pii, pi−i] ≥ J i[y, pi′i, pi−i]− , ∀i ∈ N . (4)
Although in principle, methods within RL such as TD learning can be used to compute the equilibrium
policies (Sutton and Barto 1998), learning takes place in the product space of the state space and the set of
actions across agents, so the problem complexity grows exponentially with the number of agents.
A second issue facing RL within MASs is the appearance of non-stationarity produced by other adaptive
agents. During the learning phase, agents update their policies and thus the way they influence the system. In
a non-cooperative MAS with even just a few agents learning independently, the presence of other adaptive
agents induces the appearance of a non-stationary environment from the perspective of an individual agent.
This in turn may severely impair the agent’s own reinforcement learning process and lead to complex and
non-convergent dynamics (Tuyls and Weiss 2012).
With these concerns, we present an alternative approach which involves studying the game (A) in an
asymptotic regime as N →∞. This results in a mean field game - an SG with an infinite population which,
as we shall show is both reducible to a single OCP and has M-NE that are −M-NE for N−player SGs
where  ∼ O( 1√
N
).
In order to show the discrete-time mean field game is reducible to single OCP, we demonstrate that they
belong to a class of games known as dynamic potential games (PGs). Before considering the mean-field
game case, let us formally define a PG in the context of an N−player SG:
Definition 2. An SG is called a (dynamic) potential game (PG) if for each agent i ∈ N and for any given
strategy profile pi ∈ Π there exists a potential function Ω : · × Πi × Π−i → R that satisfies the following
condition ∀pi′i ∈ Πi :
J i[·, (pii, pi−i)]− J i[·, (pi′i, pi−i)] = Ω[·, (pii, pi−i)]− Ω[·, (pi′i, pi−i)]. (5)
A PG has the property that any agent’s change in reward produced by a unilateral deviation in their
strategy is exactly expressible through a single global function. In PGs - the (Nash) equilibria can be found
by solving an OCP (Monderer and Shapley 1996). This is a striking result since obtaining the solution to
an OCP is, in general, an easier task than standard methods to obtain equilibria which rely on fixed point
arguments.
Mean Field Games
In this section, we introduce a mean field game (MFG) which is a central framework to our approach. Mean
field game theory is a mathematical formalism that handles large-population systems of non-cooperative ra-
tional agents. MFGs are formulated as SGs in the form (A) analysed at the asymptotic limit as the number of
agents tends to infinity. This formulation enables the collective behaviour of agents to be jointly represented
by a probability distribution over the state space (Lasry and Lions 2007).
The MFG formulation results in a description of the agents’ optimal behaviour that is compactly char-
acterised by a coupled system of partial differential equations. However, obtaining closed analytic solutions
(or even approximations by tractable numerical methods) for the system of equations is often unachievable
but for specific cases.
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This work offers a solution to this problem; in particular we introduce a learning procedure by which the
equilibria of MFG can be learned by adaptive agents. Beginning with the case in which the number of agents
is finite, we introduce the following empirical measure which describes the N agents’ joint state at time k:
mxk ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxik , (6)
where xik ∈ S and δx is the Dirac-delta distribution evaluated at the point x ∈ S.
We now study a game with an infinite number of agents by considering the formalism the N−player
game (A) in the asymptotic regime as N → ∞ which allows us to treat the ensemble in (6) as being
continuously distributed over S. We call this limiting behaviour the mean field limit which is an application
of the law of large numbers for first order (strategic) interactions in the game (A). We observe that by taking
the limit as N → ∞ and using de Finetti’s theorem5, we can replace the empirical measure (6) with a
probability distribution m ∈ P(H) where P(H) is a space of probability measures. The distribution m
describes the joint locations of all agents in terms of a distribution.
With this structure, instead of agents responding to the actions of other agents individually, each agent
now performs its actions in response to the mass which jointly represents the collection of states for all
agents.
As is standard within the MFG framework (Lasry and Lions 2007), we assume that the MFG satisfies
the indistinguishably property - that is the game is invariant under permutation of the agents’ indices.
The following concept will allow us to restrict our attention to games with a single M-NE:
Definition 3. The function v : P(H) × · → R is said to be strictly monotone in the L2− norm given
m1,m2 ∈ P(H) if the following is satisfied:∫
S
(v(m1, ·)− v(m2, ·))(m1 −m2)dx ≥ 0 =⇒ m1 ≡ m2.
The strict monotonicity condition means that in any given state, agents prefer a lower concentration
of neighbouring agents. This property is a natural feature within many practical applications in which the
presence of others reduces the available rewards for a given agent e.g. spectrum sharing (Ahmad et al. 2010).
We make use of the following result which is proved in (Lasry and Lions 2007)6:
Proposition 1 (Lasry & Lions, 2007). If the instantaneous reward function of a MFG is strictly monotone
in m ∈ P(H), then there exists a unique M-NE for the MFG.
MAS with Infinite Agents
To develop a learning procedure that scales with the number of agents, we now consider the game (A) in the
mean-field limit. We shall demonstrate that this procedure allows us to reduce the game (A) to a strategic
interaction between an agent and an entity that represents the collection of other agents. This plays a key
role in reducing the problem complexity and collapsing it to a single OCP.
We shall firstly define the N−player stochastic game (A) in the asymptotic regime. We note that in light
of the indistingushability criterion, we can drop the agent indices:
5Given a sequence of indexed random variables x1, x2, . . .which are invariant under permutations of the index, De Finetti’s theorem
(de Finetti 1931) ensures the existence of the random variable mxk in (6) in the limit as N →∞.
6In (Lasry and Lions 2007) the result is proven for mean field games with continuous action and state spaces in continuous time.
The corresponding results for discrete games (discrete state space, time and action set) have also been proven (see theorem 2, pg 6 in
(Gomes, Mohr, and Souza 2010)).
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Definition 4 (Discrete-Time Mean Field Game). We call the following system a discrete-time mean field
game if its dynamics can be represented by the following system:
xk+1 = f(xk, ak, ζk) (7)
mxk+1 = g(mxk ,ak), (8)
where ak ∼ pi for some pi ∈ Π and ak = (ak)i∈N , k ∈ 0, 1, . . . , T , for a given time horizon T < ∞,
mxk ∈ P(H) is the agent density corresponding to the asymptotic distribution (6) evaluated at xk ∈ S, pik is
a policy exercised at each time step k ≤ T and ζk is an i.i.d. variable which captures the system stochasticity.
We refer to the system (7) - (8) as game (B).
Givenmxt and pi ∈ Π with the agent index removed, we consider games where each agent has the following
reward function:
J [xt, pi,mxt ] = E
[ T∑
k=t
L(xk,mxk , ak)
∣∣∣ak ∼ pi], (9)
where xt ∈ S is some initial state and ak is the action taken by the agent.
We are now in a position to describe a MFG system at equilibrium i.e. when each agent plays a best-
response to the actions of other agents.
Given some initial state xt ∈ S , the joint solution (p˜i, m˜) to the game (B) is described by the following
triplet of equations which describes the M-NE:
p˜i ∈ argmax
pi∈Π
J [xt, pi, m˜xt ], (10)
x˜k+1 = f(x˜k, a˜k, ζk), a˜k ∼ p˜i ∈ Π (11)
m˜x˜k+1 = g(m˜x˜k , a˜k), a˜k = (a˜k)i∈N , (12)
where as before, {ζk}0≤k≤T is a collection of i.i.d random variables and, mx˜ is the agent density induced
when the policy p˜i is exercised by each agent.
An important feature of the system (10) - (12) is that the agent’s problem is reduced to a strategic interac-
tion between itself and a single entity m˜x. This property serves a crucial role in overcoming the appearance
of non-stationarity in an environment with many adaptive learners since the influence of all other agents on
the system is now fully captured a single entity m˜x which, influences the system dynamics in a way that an
adaptive agent can learn its optimal policy.
Existing methods of computing equilibria in MFGs however rely on the agents having full knowledge
of the environment to compute best responses and involve solving to non-linear partial differential equa-
tions (Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo 2017; Cardaliaguet et al. 2015) which, in a number of cases leads
to intractability of the framework. MFGs are closely related to anonymous games - games in which the
agents’ rewards do not depend on the identity of the agents they interact with (but do depend on the inter-
acting agents’ strategies). Multi-agent learning has been studied for anonymous games (Kash, Friedman,
and Halpern 2011) however, this approach requires agents to fix their policies over stages and to explicitly
compute approximate best-responses. In the following sections of the paper, we develop a technique which
enables equilibrium policies of MFGs to be computed by adaptive learners in an unknown environment
without solving partial differential equations.
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Theoretical Contribution
Mean Field Games are Potential Games
We now demonstrate that the discrete-time MFG problem (B) is reducible to an objective maximisation
problem. By proving that the discrete-time mean field game is a PG, the following theorem enables us to
reduce the problem to a single OCP:
Theorem 1. The discrete-time mean field game (B) is a PG.
We defer the proof of the theorem to the appendix. The key insight of Theorem 1 is that the M-NE
of MFGs can be computed by considering a general form of a team game in which each agent seeks to
maximise the potential function. Crucially, thanks to Theorem 1, the problem of computing the equilibrium
policy is reduced to solving a control problem for the potential function.
Learning in Large Population MAS
We now develop a model-free decentralised learning procedure based on a variant of fictitious play using
the potentiality property. This generates a sequence of polices that converges to the M-NE of the discrete-
time MFG.
Firstly, it is necessary to introduce some concepts relating to convergence to equilibria:
Definition 5. Let {pii,n}n≥1 be a set of policies for agent i ∈ N . We define a path by a sequence of strategies
ρipi , (pii,n)n≥1 ∈ ×n≥1Πi, where pii,n+1 is obtained from an update of pii,n using some given learning
rule.
Definition 6. Given pi−i ∈ Π−i, the path ρipi ∈ ×n≥1Πi is called an improvement path for agent i if after
every update the agent’s expected reward increases, formally an improvement path satisfies the following
condition:
J i[·, pii,n+1, pi−i] ≥ J i[·, pii,n, pi−i], ∀i ∈ N . (13)
Definition 7. A path converges to equilibrium if each limit point is an equilibrium.
We now describe a ‘belief-based’ learning rule known as fictitious play (Brown 1951) of which our
method is a variant: Let ρipi ∈ ×n≥1Πi be a path, then the learning rule is a fictitious play process (FPP) if
the update in the sequence {pii,n}n≥1 is performed ∀x ∈ S, ∀i ∈ N as follows:
sup
pi′∈Π
J i[x, pi′, pi−i,n] = J i[x, pii,n+1, pi−i,n], (14)
so that pii,n+1 is a best-response policy against pi−i,n.
If the FPP converges to equilibrium then we say that the game has the fictitious play property.
We now apply these definitions to the case of MFGs. We note that by the indistinguishability assumption
for MFGs, we can drop the agent indices in each of the above definitions. We define the FPP for the MFG
(B) by the following learning procedure ∀x ∈ S:
sup
pi′∈Π
J [x, pi′, m¯nx ] = J [x, pi
n+1, m¯nx ], m¯
n
x ,
1
n
n∑
j=1
mjx
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so that pin+1 is a best-response policy against m¯nx which summarises each agent’s belief of the joint state of
all agents after the nth update.
In order to solve game (B) we therefore seek a learning process that produces a sequence {(pin,mn)}n≥1
for which {pin}n≥1 is an improvement path for the policy pin.
For the discrete-time MFG, we shall seek a pair (pin,mn) ∈ Π× P(H) that converges to equilibrium as
n→∞ so that the sequence {(pin,mn)}n∈N converges to a cluster point (p˜i, m˜) which is a solution to (B).
Our convergence result is constructed using results that we now establish. Before proving the result we
report an important result in the model-based setting:
Proposition 2 (Cardaliaguet, Hadikhanloo; 2017). Mean Field Games have the fictitious play property.
This result was established in (Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo 2017) within a continuous-time and model-
based setting. Here, given some initial belief about the distribution mn and some initial value function
vn associated to each agent’s problem, the agents update the pair (vn,mn) according to a (model-based)
fictitious play procedure. This produces a paired sequence {(vn,mn)}n≥1 for which limn→∞(vn,mn) =
(v˜, m˜) where (v˜, m˜) is joint solution to the continuous-time MFG.
In order to compute the best responses at each step, the FPP discussed in (Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo
2017) requires agents to use knowledge of their reward functions. Moreover, the agents’ update procedure
involves solving a system of partial differential equations at each time step. Obtaining closed solutions to
this system of equations is generally an extremely difficult task and often no method of obtaining closed
solutions exists.
We are therefore interested in procedures for which agents can achieve their M-NE policies by simple
adaptive play with no prior knowledge of the environment. We are now in position to state our main result:
Theorem 2. There exists a fictitious-play improvement path process such that the sequence {(pin,mn)}n≥1 ∈
Π× P(H) converges to an −M-NE of the game (A).
The following corollary demonstrates that we can construct a learning procedure that leads to an im-
provement path, the limit point of which is a solution of the MFG (B).
Corollary 1. Let {(un,mn)}n≥1 be a mean field improvement path generated by an actor-critic fictitious
play method, then {(un,mn)} converges to a cluster point {(u,m)}. Moreover, the cluster point {(u,m)}
is a solution to (B).
Corollary 1 immediately leads to our method which computes the optimal policies for the MFG (B).
The method uses an actor-critic framework with TD learning on the critic and policy gradient on the learner.
An episode is simulated using some initial belief over the distribution m over S . The agent then updates its
policy using an actor-critic and updates the distribution mk fictitiously.
The Approximation Error
In this section, we show that the Nash equilibria generated by the game (B) are approximate equilibria
for the N−player stochastic game (A).
Theorem 3. Let p¯i, p˜i ∈ Π be the NE strategy profile for the game (A) and game (B) respectively and let be
a NE strategy profile for the MFG (B). Let m˜x and m¯x be the distributions generated by the agents in the
mean field game and the N−player SG respectively; then there exists a constant c > 0 s.th ∀x ∈ S:
|J(x, p˜i, m˜x)− J(x, p¯i, m¯x)| < c\
√
N. (15)
8
Theorem 3 says that the solution to the MFG (B) is in fact an −M-NE to the N−agent SG (A). More-
over, the approximation error from using a MFG to approximate the N−player game is O( 1√
N
)
.
As a direct consequence of theorem 3, we can use the actor-critic fictitious play method on the MFG
formulation (B) to compute near-optimal policy solutions of the stochastic game (A). Moreover, the error
produced by the mean field approximation vanishes asymptotically as we consider systems with increasing
numbers of agents.
Experiments
To investigate convergence of our method, we present three experiments drawn from benchmark prob-
lems within economics and control theory that involve large populations of strategically interacting agents.
In each case, we show that our method converges to an M-NE policy.
We firstly demonstrate the use of our technique in a (stochastic) congestion game, testing the conver-
gence to a stationary policy in a large-population system with a complicated reward structure. The second
problem is a supply and demand problem that we formulate as an SG allowing us to test convergence to
optimal policies in dynamic problems requiring long-term strategic planning in the presence of other learn-
ing agents. This demonstrates that our method is able to overcome the non-stationary interference of other
adaptive agents. Lastly, we apply our method to study a multi-agent generalisation of a fundamental problem
within optimal control theory, namely the linear quadratic control (LQC) problem. The analytic solution of
the LQC problem allows us to verify that our method converges to a known M-NE policy.
Experiment 1: Spatial Congestion Game
In the spatial congestion game the rewards are dependent on the agents’ use of a shared resource (a sub-
region of S ⊂ R2) and the number agents using that resource. Games of this type are known as congestion
games and represent a large class of interactions e.g. spectrum sharing problems.
In the spatial congestion (SC) game there are N agents, given some initial position x0 ∈ S , each agent
chooses an action in order to move to a desired location xT ∈ S which is a terminal state. Certain areas of S
are more desirable to occupy than others, however the agents are averse to occupying crowded areas - they
receive the largest rewards for occupying parts of S that are both desirable and have relatively low concen-
trations of agents. The agents simultaneously select a movement vector u ∈ R2×1 resulting in movement to
a terminal state xT . Each agent then receives its reward L which depends on the desirability of the location
and the concentration of agents mxT at xT .
Formally, we model the desirability of a region xt ∈ S at time t as7:
L(xt,mxt) =
1
2pi
√|Σ| e−(xt−µ)
TΣ−1(xt−µ)
(1 +mxt)
α
,
where mxt ∈ P(H) is the density of agents at the point xt and µ ∈ R2,Σ ∝ 12×2 are given parameters
representing the mean and spread of the distribution of the rewards over S. The map L : S × P(H) → R
measures the instantaneous reward for an agent at xt with a local agent density mxt . The parameter α > 0
is a measure of each agent’s averseness to occupying the same region as other agents with higher values
representing greater averseness.
Given some initial position x0 ∈ S and u ∈ R2×1, the transition dynamics are given by the following
expression:
xT = f1(x0, u, ) , A1x0 +B1u+ σ1, (16)
7We note that the function L is continuously differentiable in S so that assumption 2 is a fortiori satisfied, moreover, it can be easily
verified that assumption 3 holds.
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Figure 1: a) Rewards over 2000 episodes of training for a Gaussian distribution of desirability. b) agent
distributions for different averseness parameter α. c) agent distribution for bimodal Gaussian function reward
function.
where  ∼ N (0, σ);σ1, A1, B1 ∝ 1(2×2) and c, σ ∈ R+.
The reward function for an agent is then given by the following expression:
J [x0, pi,mx0 ] = ExT∼f1
[
L(xT ,mxT )−
1
2
uTRu
∣∣u ∼ pi],
where R = η1(2×2) is a control weight matrix and η ∈ R is the marginal control cost (cost of movement).
Using the indistingishability condition, we have omitted agent indices.
At equilibrium each agent optimally trades-off state-dependent rewards with its proximity to nearby agents.
The problem generalises the beach domain problem studied in (Devlin et al. 2014) since we now con-
sider a reward function with state dependency. In particular, the desirability over S is described by a Gaussian
function over S. Moreover the problem we now consider consists of a system with 1000 interacting agents.
The problem is also closely related to the spectrum sharing problem, see (Ahmad et al. 2010). In accor-
dance with the theory, our method converges to a stable policy - after 2,000 episodes of training we find that
the agent’s policy and rewards stabilise Figure 1.a). Figure 1.b) shows the terminal distribution of agents over
S for α ∈ {1.0, 2.0, 3.0}. We observe that the agents learn to optimally trade-off state-dependent rewards
with distance from neighbouring agents resulting in a fixed terminal distribution of agents. As expected, the
agents disperse themselves further as the value of α is increased - in all cases converging to a stable distri-
bution over S.
Figure 1.c) shows the distribution of agents for a more complicated reward structure specified by a mix-
ture of two Gaussians over S with peaks at (−1, 0) and (0, 0)). We initialise the agents at the point (1, 0). In
this case, an individual agent’s reward is given by the following expression:
J [x0, pi,mx0 ] = ExT∼f1
[ 2∑
i=1
Li(xT ,mxT )−
1
4
uTi Rui
]
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a)
b)
Figure 2: a) Paths of agents with different initial points (coordinates indicated) for cost of movement η = 2.
Shown in black is the path of the rewards (demand) and in purple is the path of agents with η = 0. b) The
intra-episode rewards for the paths show in a). Note incursion of negative rewards.
where Li(xt,mxt) , [16pi2|Σi|]−
1
2 e−(xt−µi)
TΣ−1i (xt−µi)
· (1 + mxt)−α and ui ∼ pi. Since learning is internal to each agent, a possible (suboptimal) outcome is for
the agents to cluster at the nearest peak of rewards. However, using our method, the agents learn to spread
themselves across the state space and distribute themselves across both peaks.
Experiment 2: Supply with Uncertain Demand
Optimally distributing goods and services according to demand is a fundamental problem within logistics
and industrial organisation. In order to maximise their revenue, firms must strategically locate their supplies
given some uncertain future demand whilst considering the actions of rival firms which may reduce the
firm’s own prospects.
We now apply our method to a supply and demand problem in which individual firms seek to maximise
their revenue by strategically placing their goods when the demand process has future uncertainty. The de-
mand process, which quantifies the level of demand associated with each point in space, is a priori unknown
and is affected by the actions of thousands of rival firms. Each firm directs supply of its goods to regions in
time and space however, the firms face transport costs so that each firm seeks to optimally trade-off trans-
portation costs and tracking the demand. As firms begin to concentrate on a particular area of demand, the
sale opportunities diminish, reducing the rewards associated to that region of demand.
We model this problem as an episodic problem with a distribution of rewards traversing a path through
the state space S ∈ R2 (illustrated in Figure 2.a)). Agents seek to locate themselves in areas of high con-
centrations of rewards for a fixed number (30) time steps. The agents are penalised for both movement and
occupying areas with a high density of other agents. The experiment tests the ability of the method to avoid
convergence to suboptimal outcomes. In particular, movement costs are highly convex so traversing the path
of rewards leads to low overall rewards.
Figure 2.a) illustrates the path of the agents after training for several different initial positions. An inter-
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esting outcome is that with non-zero movement costs, the agents learn to move horizontally to intersect the
path of the rewards at a later time. This behaviour conforms with intuition - to maximise long-term rewards
the agents must choose a path that initially incurs higher costs, forgoing immediate rewards whilst they tra-
verse the regions with sparse rewards.
Figure 2.b) shows that the agents are able to learn to initially incur negative rewards to maximise their cumu-
lative payoffs. Without long-term planning each agent would attempt to trace the same path as the rewards.
Such a strategy would lead to reduced overall rewards since attempting to match the locations of the rewards
is prohibitively costly. Setting η = 0 we see that the agents trace the path of the rewards (represented by the
dashed purple line in Figure 2.a)).
Experiment 3: Mean-Field Linear Quadratic Regulator
The linear quadratic control (LQC) problem is a fundamental problem within optimal stochastic control the-
ory (OSCT). It concerns a system whose transition dynamics evolves according to a stochastic process that
is linearly controlled subject to quadratic costs. The LQC problem essentially captures the local problem of
a large class of problems in OSCT and can be solved analytically, the solution being given by the linear-
quadratic regulator (Bardi 2012; Xu 2007). LQC models have been extended to mean field interactions in
which a large population of agents affect the dynamics of a system using linear controls subject to quadratic
control costs and a cost term which depends on the actions of other agents.
The reward function for the LQC problem is given by:
J [x0, u,mx0 ] = ExT∼f2
[ Tn∑
t=0
{C(xt, m¯xt)−
1
2
uTt Rut}
]
,
where C(xt,mxt) , −(xt − α)TQt(xt − α).
At time k ≤ Tn, given some position xk ∈ S , each agent then chooses an vector control parameter ut ∈
R2×1. The transition are given by the following expression:
xk+1 = f2(xk, uk, k) , A1xk +B1uk + σ1k, (17)
where k ∼ N (0, σk) ∀k < Tn, A1, B1 ∝ 1(2×2), σ1 = c1(2×2) where c ∈ R+ is some constant that
measures the magnitude of the stochasticity in each agent’s transition.
In (Bardi 2012) the distribution mx is reported after convergence to the stationary M-NE. We compare
our results (E3) with this stationary policy (B1) in the following table:
B1 E3
µ (0.50000, -0.50000) (0.50717, -0.50537)
σ2 0.14060 0.16100
Clearly, our results converge to values that closely replicate the analytic solution.
Conclusion
We develop an approach to MARL with large numbers of agents. This is the first paper to prove convergence
results to best-response policies in multi-agent systems with an unbounded number of agents. This allows
RL to be applied across a broader range of applications with large agent populations, in contrast to current
methods (Hu and Wellman 2004; Littman 2001; Littman 1994). Our approach advances existing work in
MFGs as in (Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo 2017) that require both full knowledge of the environment and
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to perform involved analytic computation. In contrast, by developing a connection between RL in MASs and
MFGs, we demonstrate a procedure that is model-free, enabling agents to learn best-response policies solely
through adaptive play which overcomes the problem of non-stationarity. In our experiments we provide a
novel approach of analysing problems in control theory and economics.
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Supplementary Material
Experimental Setup
In all three experiments, all learning was performed in TensorFlow using actor-critic method with the
Adam optimiser. The actor is represented by a two-layer fully connected network represented by a neural
network with a Gaussian output with variance 0.1. The critic is a two-layer fully connected neural network.
The experimental parameters are as follows: the learning rates in experiments 1, 2 and 3 were set to 10−4,
10−3 and 10−3 respectively. In all experiments we used a discount factor of 0.99. Experiment 1 is a one-shot
game, experiment 2 was run for 30 time steps. We ran experiment 1 with 1,000 agents and experiments 2
and 3 with 200 agents. In experiment 1, the agents’ initial position was sampled from a Gaussian distribution
N ((1, 0), 0.1). For experiment 2 the agents’ initial position was sampled from a GaussianN ((x, 0.10) where
the mean x took the values x ∈ {(−0.20, 0.00), (−0.20, 0.30),
(−0.39, 0.16), (−0.60, 0.00), (−0.6, 0.30)}. In experiments 1 and 2, for each initial position we performed 6
runs. For experiment 1 we set the marginal cost parameter η = 0 and for experiment 2, η = 2. In experiment
1 we tested for α ∈ {1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0} and in experiment 2 we set α = 0.1.
Assumptions
The results within the paper are built under the following assumptions on the instantaneous reward function
L and the functions f and g.
Assumption 1. The function f(x, y, ·) is Lipschitz continuous in (x, y).
Assumption 2. The function g(x, y) is Lipschitz continuous in (x, y).
Assumption 3. The instantaneous reward functionL(s, x, y, u) is Ho¨lder-continuous in (s, x, y) and convex
in u.
Assumption 4. The instantaneous reward function L is monotone in m (in the sense of definition 3) and
both convex and separable u.
Assumption 5. The function L(·,m) : P(H) → R is C1 in the sense of (Cardaliaguet et al. 2015), that is
there exists a continuous map δLδm s.t.:
L(·,m′)− L(·,m) =
∫ ∫
δL
δm
(x, (1− t)m+ tm′)(m′ −m)(dx)dt ∀m,m′ ∈ P(H).
Assumption 6. The instantaneous reward function L is bounded.
Technical Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
The following set of results are instructive for the proof of theorem 1:
Proposition 3. Identical interest games are PGs.
The following result allows us to make use of proposition 1 in the context of mean field games:
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Lemma 1. Mean field games are identical interest games.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the indistinguishability condition - in particular we note that
the potentiality condition (c.f. in Definition 2)) is satisfied by the instantaneous function L itself.
To prove the theorem, we exploit directly assumption 4 from which we can deduce the existence of the
quantity δLδm . Thus, in full analogy with lemma 4.4 in (Monderer and Shapley 1996), we conclude that the
game has a potential and that the equilibria of the mean field game (B) can be obtained by maximising the
potential function.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof of theorem 3 exploits both the boundedness properties and continuity of the functions f
and J . We build the proof in two parts the main part of which is given by the following result which we shall
prove immediately:
Given NE strategy profile for the game (A), p¯i ∈ Π and a NE strategy profile for the mean field game (B)
p˜i then the following inequalities hold:
1. |f(x˜, ·)− f(x¯, ·)| < c√
N
2. |J(x˜, p˜i, m˜x˜)− J(x¯, p¯i, m¯x)| < c supk∈[t,T ] |x˜k − x¯k|
where c > 0 is an arbitrary constant (that may vary in each line) and as before m˜ and m¯ are the distributions
generated by the agents in the mean field game and the N−player stochastic game respectively.
The first inequality bounds the difference in trajectories between the instance that the agents use the
control for the mean field game and the control for the N−player stochastic game. The second inequality
bounds the change in rewards received by the agents after perturbations in their location. Since the agents
use closed-loop policies, we will make use of the result to describe changes in their policies.
Let N be the number of agents in the N−player stochastic game (A), then given p¯i and p˜i as in part I,
if xN and x˜ are solutions to the processes (1) and (7) respectively, i.e. xNk+1 = f(x
i
k, a
i
k, 
i
k) and x˜k+1 =
f(xk, ak, k) where aik ∼ p¯i and a˜k ∼ p˜i.
To prove ‖xNk − x˜k‖ ≤ ck√N we firstly must modify the representation of the function f as a function
purely in terms of the spatial variables.
By (Xu 2007), the policy pi can be expressed by a function of the form Γ : Si × S−i → R s.t.: pi =
Γ(xi, x−i), moreover, the function Γ is Lipschitz continuous in each variable.
We note that for any given pair xik ∈ Si, x−ik ∈ S−i we can therefore express the transition function f
in the following way ∀k ≤ T :
f(xik, a
i
k, ζk) ≡ Θ(xik, x−ik , ζk), aik ∼ pi (A18)
where {ζk} is a set of i.i.d. random variables and the function Θ is a bounded, Lipschitz continuous function.
By the same reasoning (and recalling (6) - (7)), given a NE policy for the discrete MFG (B), p˜i ∈ Π and
the induced mean field distribution mx˜ ∈ P(H), we can similarly express the transition dynamics for the
discrete-time MFG in terms of the function Θ as f(x˜k, ak, ζk) ≡ Θ(x˜k,mx˜k , ζk) where ak ∼ p˜i. Moreover,
given the boundedness of the function Θ, we also make the following observation which bounds the variance
taken w.r.t x ∈ S, ∀k ≤ T :
d∑
l=1
var
(
1
n
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(xik, x
−i
k , ·)
)
≤ k
n
(1 + max
l
‖Θl‖∞)2 ≤ ck
N
, (A19)
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where ‖fl‖ denotes the bound on the lth component of Θ.
We secondly note that using (A18) and by the state transition equations (1) and (7) we note that we can
express the difference in trajectories as:
‖xNk − x˜k‖ = E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x¯ik, x¯
j
k, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x˜k, x
′, ζ)m(dx′)
∥∥∥].
We now prove the statement by induction on the time index k ∈ N.
In the base case, we seek to prove the following bound:
‖xN1 − x˜1‖ ≤
ck√
N
,
which is equivalent to the following inequality:
E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x0, x
j
0, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x0, x
′, ·)m(dx′)
∥∥∥] ≤ ck√
N
This follows straightforwardly since
E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x0, x
j
0, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x0, x
′, ·)m(dx′)
∥∥∥2]
≤
d∑
l=1
var
(
1
n
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x0, x−i, ·)
)
≤ ck
N
,
using the variance bound (A19) by reordering the expression, after applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
we arrive at the required result.
For the general case, we firstly make the following inductive hypothesis:
‖xNk − x˜k‖ ≤
ck√
N
,
We therefore seek to show that the following bound is satisfied:
‖xNk+1 − x˜k+1‖ ≤
ck√
N
,
which is equivalent to:
E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x¯ik, x¯
j
k, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x˜k, x
′, ζ)m(dx′)
∥∥∥] ≤ ck√
N
. (A20)
To achieve this, we consider the term:
E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(xik, x
j
k, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(xik, x
′, ζ)m(dx′)
∥∥∥].
17
Now by the triangle inequality and the Lipschitz continuity of Θ we have that:
E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(xik, x
j
k, ζ)−
1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x¯ik, x
j
k, ζ)
∥∥∥]
+E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x¯ik, x
j
k, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x¯ik, x¯
j
k, ζ)
∥∥∥]+ E[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x¯ik, x¯
j
k, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x˜k, x
′, ζ)m(dx′)
∥∥∥]
≤ c1‖xik − x¯ik‖+ c2
1
N
N∑
j 6=i
‖xjk − x¯jk‖+ E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(x¯ik, x¯
j
k, ζ)−
∫
S
Θ(x˜k, x
′, ζ)m(dx′)
∥∥∥],
where c1, c2 > 0 are arbitrary (Lipschitz) constants. After summing over i and dividing by N and, using
(A20) we deduce the required result.
For part (ii) we exploit the Lipschitzianity of the function L. Moreover, since the policy pi can be ex-
pressed as pi = Γ(xi, x−i) we express the instantaneous function L as Lˆ : Si × S−i using (Xu 2007).
We now observe the following estimate:
E
[∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j 6=i
Lˆ(x¯ik, x
i
k)−
∫
S
Lˆ(x˜k, x
′)m(dx′)
∥∥∥]
≤ c1‖xik − x¯ik‖+ c2
1
N
N∑
j 6=i
‖xjk − x¯jk‖+
[
d∑
l=1
var
(
1
n
N∑
j 6=i
Θ(xik, x
−i
k , ·)
)] 1
2
.
where c1, c2 > 0 are arbitrary constants.
As in part (i), after summing in i and dividing by N and, using the result in part (i) we deduce the
result.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The theorem is proved by demonstrating that given some initial belief m˜0 of the distribution m,
each agent can generate an iterative sequence {m˜n}{n∈N} s.th. {m˜n}{n∈N} → m as n → ∞. Thereafter,
we deploy a two-timescales method (Borkar 2008; Leslie and Collins 2006) so that the the beliefs of the
distribution (at a given state) are updated slowly and thus are quasi-static from the perspective of the updating
procedure for the policy. In particular, in the following, we show that provided the updating procedure to the
agent’s belief of the distribution m˜ are performed at a sufficiently pace relative to the updates to the policy,
the problem is reduced to an optimisation problem for each agent where at each stage of the iteration each
agent plays an approximate best-response given some belief of the distribution of the agents (evaluated at
the agent’s own location). The agents improve their policies using a stochastic gradient procedure which,
with an update to the distribution that appears static, produces enough traction to enable convergence to the
optimal policy.
Consider first, each agent’s optimal value function which, given a belief of the distribution m˜ is given by
the following:
vpi,m˜(x) , sup
pi′∈Π
J [x, pi′, m˜x], (21)
Suppose also that each agent has a belief m˜n of the distribution m˜ over n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., iterations which are
updated using a procedure that we will later specify (this can in fact be viewed as a parameter of the value
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function at iteration n), then following (21) we can define the nth iterate of v by the following expression:
vpi,m˜n (x) , sup
pi′∈Π
J [x, pi′, m˜nx ], ∀x ∈ S (22)
Using the boundedness of L we observe that sup
n
|vpi,m˜n (x)| = sup
n,pi′∈Π
J [x, pi′, m˜nx ] ≤
∑T
k=t ‖L‖∞ < ∞, so
that the sequence {vpi,m˜n (x)}n≥1 consists of bounded terms.
Let us analogously define the nth fictitious best-response as:
p˜in ∈ argsup
pi′∈Π
vpi
′,m˜n
n (x), ∀x ∈ S (23)
Suppose that each iteration each agent updates their belief over the distribution via the procedure:
m˜n+1x = m˜
n
x + β(n)[B(a
n, m˜nx) +M
(m˜)
n+1], n = 0, 1, . . . , ∀x ∈ S, an ∼ vn (24)
where β(n) is a positive step-size function s.th.
∑
n β(n) = ∞ and
∑
n β(n)
2 < ∞, B : A × R → R is
some well-behaved function (recall that mx ∈ Rd is the agent density evaluated at the point ∈ S ⊂ Rd) and
M
(m˜)
n is a martingale difference sequence8. In particular, we assume that B is Lipschitz continuous in both
variables and satisfies a growth condition i.e ‖B(x, y)‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖(x, y)‖) for any (x, y) ∈ A × P(H) and
‖B(x, y)−B(w, z)‖ ≤ d‖(x, y)− (w, z)‖ for any (w, z), (x, y) ∈ A× P(H) for some constants c, d > 0.
We note that since the update can be viewed as an updating procedure over a parameterisation of the
value function, the update in (24) can be viewed as a critic update of the value function vm˜n (parame-
terised by m˜1, m˜2, . . .) within the context of a mean field game. It can be straightforwardly shown that∑
n β(n)M
(m˜)
n <∞ (see for example, Appendix C in (Borkar 2008)).
Since the action an is sampled from the policy pin and, using (23), we can rewrite (24) as the following
expression:
m˜n+1x = m˜
n
x + β(n)[B
′(vn, m˜n) +M
(m˜)
n+1], n = 0, 1, . . . ∀x ∈ S (25)
for some mapB′ which maps to and from the same spaces and satisfies the same assumptions asB (we have
suppressed the super-indices on the function v).
Our goal is to show that the following expression holds ∀x ∈ S:
lim
n→∞ v
p˜in,m˜n
n (x) = v
λ(mx),mx a.s. (26)
where (λ(m),m) is a fixed point solution to the MFG system (B) (i.e. λ(m) ∈ suppi′∈Π vpi
′(mx),mx(x)).
Let us now consider the following update procedure for vn:
vn+1(x) = vn(x) + α(n)[A(pi
n, m˜nx) +M
(pi)
n+1], n = 0, 1, . . . ∀x ∈ S (27)
where M (pi)n is a martingale difference sequence and A : Π×R→ R is a Lipschitz continuous function that
satisfies a growth condition in both variables and where α is a positive step-size function s.th.
∑
n α(n) =∞
and
∑
n α(n)
2 < ∞ and is chosen such that α(n)\β(n) ∼ O( 1np ) for some p > 1 so that the belief m˜n
is updated slowly relative to pi and α(n)\β(n) → 0 as n → ∞. In a similar way it can be shown that∑
n α(n)M
(pi)
n <∞.
8W.r.t. the increasing family of σ− algebras σ(xl,M(m˜)l , l ≤ n).
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We can now rewrite the update process over m˜ as the following:
m˜n+1x = m˜
n
x + α(n)[Bˆ
′(vn, m˜nx) + Mˆ
(m˜)
n+1], n = 0, 1, . . . (28)
where Bˆ′(vn, m˜nx) , β(n)α(n)B′(vn, m˜nx) and Mˆ
(m˜)
n+1 ,
β(n)
α(n)M
(m˜)
n+1. We note that the sequence {m˜nx}n≥1
is quasi-static w.r.t. the sequence {vn}n≥1, moreover the sequence {vn}n≥1 converges when m˜nx is fixed
at a particular n ∈ N (the result follows since it can be shown that vn strictly increases whenever vn is
suboptimal).
Let us firstly recall that sup
n
|vpi,m˜n (x)| < ∞ and
∑
n α(n)M
(pi)
n < ∞. Analogously, we have that∑
n α(n)Mˆ
(m˜)
n =
∑
n β(n)M
(m˜)
n < ∞ moreover, since m˜nx is defined over a bounded domain and, us-
ing Assumption 2 we deduce that sup
n
|m˜nx | <∞. We can therefore apply theorem 2, ch. 6 in (Borkar 2008)
from which find that limn→∞(vp˜i
n,m˜
n , m˜
n) → (vλ(m),m,m) a.s. after which, using (23), we deduce the
thesis.
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